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Abstract
The Ares I-X flight test, launched in 2009, is the first test of the Ares I crew launch vehicle. This
development flight test evaluated the flight dynamics, roll control, and separation events, but also
provided early insights into logistical, stacking, launch, and recovery operations for Ares I.
Operational lessons will be especially important for NASA as the agency makes the transition from
the Space Shuttle to the Constellation Program, which is designed to be less labor-intensive. The mission
team itself comprised only 700 individuals over the life of the project compared to the thousands involved
in Shuttle and Apollo missions; while missions to and beyond low-Earth orbit obviously will require
additional personnel, this “lean” approach will serve as a model for future Constellation missions.
To prepare for Ares I-X, vehicle stacking and launch infrastructure had to be modified at Kennedy
Space Center’s Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) as well as Launch Complex (LC) 39B. In the VAB,
several platforms and other structures designed for the Shuttle’s configuration had to be removed to
accommodate the in-line, much taller Ares I-X. Vehicle preparation activities resulted in delays, but also
in lessons learned for ground operations personnel, including hardware deliveries, cable routing,
transferred work and custodial paperwork. Ares I-X also proved to be a resource challenge, as individuals
and ground service equipment (GSE) supporting the mission also were required for Shuttle or Atlas V
operations at LC 40/41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station.
At LC 39B, several Shuttle-specific access arms were removed and others were added to
accommodate the in-line Ares vehicle. Ground command, control, and communication (GC3) hardware
was incorporated into the Mobile Launcher Platform (MLP). The lightning protection system at LC 39B
was replaced by a trio of 600-foot-tall towers connected by a catenary wire to account for the much
greater height of the vehicle. Like Shuttle, Ares I-X will be stacked on a MLP and rolled out to the pad on
a Saturn-era crawler-transporter. While Ares I-X was only held in place by the four hold-down posts on
its aft skirt during rollout, a new vehicle stabilization system (VSS) attached to the vertical service
structure kept the vehicle from undue swaying prior to launch at the pad, LC 39B.
Following the launch, the flight test vehicle first stage was recovered with the aid of new parachutes
resized to accommodate the five-segment-long first stage, which had a much greater length and mass than
the Shuttle’s reusable solid rocket boosters. After splashdown, recovery divers exercised extra care when
handling the first stage to ensure that the flight data recorders in the fifth segment simulator were not
damaged by exposure to sea water. The data recovered from the Ares I-X flight test will be very valuable
in verifying the predicted environments and models used to design the vehicle.
Lessons learned from Ares I-X will be shared with the Ares Projects through written and verbal
reports and through integration of mission team members into the Project workforce.
I. Introduction
Since 2005, NASA’s Constellation Program has been designing, building, and testing the next
generation of launch and space vehicles to carry humans beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO), including the
Ares I crew launch vehicle and Ares V cargo launch vehicle. Ares I and Ares V are being managed by the
Ares Projects out of NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, AL.
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Ares I is designed to carry up to four astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS). It also can be
launched in tandem with the Ares V cargo launch vehicle to perform a variety of missions beyond LEO.
The Ares I-X development flight test was conceived in 2006 to acquire early engineering, operations, and
environment data during liftoff, ascent, and first stage recovery for Ares I. The flight test data from Ares
I-X will be used to improve the Ares I design before its critical design review in 2011—the final review
before manufacturing of the flight vehicle begins.
II. Vehicle Elements & Mission Objectives
Figure 1. Ares I-X performs a “fly-away” maneuver
just after liftoff from Kennedy Space Center’s
Launch Complex 39B.
The Ares I-X flight test vehicle (FTV, Figure
1) was not designed to be a full-up space launch
vehicle, but rather a development test article for
evaluating how the rocket performs from liftoff
through first stage separation. The rocket consisted
of a four-segment solid rocket booster (SRB) from
the Space Shuttle inventory with new forward
structures, an active roll control system (RoCS),
Atlas V avionics, and outer mold line simulators
for the upper stage, Orion crew module, and launch
abort system.
The flight and ground elements were
developed, built, and integrated at multiple NASA
centers, with the first stage managed at MSFC in
Alabama and fabricated at ATK in Utah; the
avionics systems managed by MSFC and built and
tested by a combined Jacobs Engineering/Lockheed
Martin team in Alabama and Colorado; the roll
control engines managed at MSFC and
reconfigured for Ares I-X at Teledyne Brown
Engineering in Huntsville, AL; the upper stage
simulator built at Glenn Research Center (GRC) in
Ohio; the crew module/launch abort system
(CM/LAS) simulator built and systems engineering
and integration (SE&I) function performed at
Langley Research Center (LaRC) in Virginia; and
the ground systems and operations performed at
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida.
This part-active, part-simulator vehicle was designed to achieve— and met—all of the following
objectives:
Demonstrate control of a dynamically similar, integrated Ares I/Orion, using Ares I relevant
ascent control algorithms
Perform an in-flight separation/staging event between a Ares I-similar first stage and a
representative upper stage
Demonstrate assembly and recovery of a new Ares I-like first stage element at KSC
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
2
• Demonstrate first stage separation sequencing, and quantify first stage atmospheric entry
dynamics, and parachute performance
• Characterize magnitude of integrated vehicle roll torque throughout first stage flight
III. Operational Lessons Learned
Operational lessons from Ares I-X will be especially important for NASA as the agency retires the
Space Shuttle and transitions to the Constellation Program, which is designed to explore beyond LEO, but
also be less labor-intensive during stacking and pad operations. The Ares I-X mission had a “lean” team,
comprising approximately 700 civil servant employees over the life of the project compared to the
thousands involved in Shuttle and Apollo missions. While missions to and beyond low-Earth orbit
obviously will require additional personnel, this lean approach will serve as a model for future
Constellation missions. The effort to design, build, transport, assemble, and launch Ares I-X provides an
opportunity for a new generation of engineers and operations staff to work with a new launch vehicle.
Logistics and Infrastructure
Several special arrangements had to be made to transport all of the vehicle elements to KSC.
Additionally, vehicle stacking and launch infrastructure had to be modified at KSC’s Vehicle Assembly
Building (VAB) and Launch Complex (LC) 39B to accommodate this new rocket.
Because the Ares I-X flight test vehicle (FTV) was built at multiple sites across the nation, it required
multiple means of transportation to reach KSC. The first stage motor segments traveled from the ATK
plant in Utah to Florida by rail, using methods and equipment already set up to support the Space Shuttle.
The new forward structures arrived from an ATK subcontractor via truck from Indiana. The CM/LAS
simulator was flown to KSC on a U.S. Air Force C-5 cargo transport.
The upper stage simulator (USS) required the most complex transportation logistics, as Glenn
Research Center (GRC) in Ohio traditionally has not been part of NASA’s launch vehicle infrastructure
(Figure 2). The USS had to be broken up into 11 cylindrical sections known as “tuna cans” no taller than
9.5 feet (2.9 meters) to ensure that they could fit under bridges when transported by truck via interstate
highways and under bridges when transported by commercial barge on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.
The USS segments also included interior platforms and ladders to give ground operations staff access to
interior sections above the height of the Shuttle-era fixed service structure (FSS) at Launch Complex 39B.
Figure 2. Transport sequence for the Ares I-X Upper Stage Simulator: tractor-trailer to the Ohio River,
barge transport on the Delta Mariner to KSC, tractor-trailer from port to the VAB.
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Figure 3. Platform C was removed from the VAB’s High Bay 3
(top) and other platforms were added (bottom) to give ground
operations staff access to the Ares I-X interstage segment.
In the VAB, several platforms and
other structures designed for the Space
Shuttle’s configuration had to be
removed to accommodate the much
taller, in-line design of Ares I-X, while
other platforms and environmental
control systems had to be installed to
meet flight test needs (Figure 3).
Vehicle preparation activities
resulted in lessons learned for ground
operations personnel, including hardware
deliveries, cable routing, transferred work
and custodial paperwork.
Ares I-X also proved to be a resource
challenge, as individuals and ground
service equipment (GSE) supporting the
mission also were required for Shuttle or
Atlas V operations at LC 40/41 at Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station. Conflicts
over resources will continue to be a
challenge for the agency in the next few
years, especially if Ares flight tests
continue while the Space Shuttle
Program is extended.
At LC 39B, several Shuttle-specific
access arms were removed (e.g. the
gaseous oxygen “cap” usually attached to
the top of the external tank) and others
were added (the vehicle stabilization
system, environmental control system,
and access bridge for the first stage
avionics module) to accommodate the
Ares I-X FTV (Figure 4). However, this
work was delayed by resource conflicts,
including a launch-on-need backup
mission for the Hubble Space Telescope
servicing flight in August 2009.
Figure 4. Gaseous oxygen arm being removed (left) and artist’s
concept (right) depicting hardware added to LC 39B for Ares I-
X.
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Figure 5. The GC3 rack installed in the Mobile Launcher
Platform also is used to control Atlas V.
Figure 6. The VAB Launch Control Center’s Firing Room 1,
before (top) and after (bottom) refurbishment for Ares I-X.
Ground command, control, and
communication (GC3) hardware was
incorporated into the Mobile Launcher
Platform (MLP). The primary function of
the GC3 unit, an Atlas V system provided
by Lockheed Martin, was to provide
control and data interfaces between the
FTV and ground operations during
countdown operations.
Perhaps the most dramatic change
made to KSC’s launch infrastructure was
made to the VAB Launch Control
Center’s Firing Room 1. Originally used
to launch the first Space Shuttle mission,
Firing Room 1 received a complete
refurbishment of its wiring, computer,
console, and interior fixtures. The entire
room was not needed, given the limited
scope of Ares I-X, but once flight testing
is completed, the room will be remade to
support full Constellation Program
missions to the International Space
Station, the Moon, and beyond.
The lightning protection system at
LC 39B was replaced by a trio of 600-
foot-tall towers connected by a catenary
wire to account for the much greater
height of the vehicle (Figure 7). These
towers will be kept in place when the rest
of the LC 39B service structure is
dismantled to make way for purpose-built
structures needed for the Constellation
Program.
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Figure 7. The single lightning mast atop the fixed service
structure (FSS) at LC 39B (top) was replaced by a trio of
towers (bottom).
Like Shuttle, Ares I-X was stacked on a MLP and rolled out to the pad on an Apollo-era crawler-
transporter. Ares I-X was held in place by the four hold-down posts attached to the first stage aft skirt
during rollout, and a new vehicle stabilization system (VSS) added to the vertical service structure kept
the vehicle from swaying on the pad prior to launch. Both systems proved more than sturdy enough to
keep the vehicle vertical. Wind-induced oscillations, even during winds up to 25 knots, did not exceed
three inches over the entire length of the 327-foot rocket. The VSS itself, comprising commercial
hydraulic struts, was a low-cost design choice made late in the project that proved as effective as a
proposed support tower built atop the MLP. The use of commercial hardware saved the agency millions
of dollars.
Vehicle Stacking and Launch
The stacking of Ares I-X went very smoothly, demonstrating the conscientious efforts by the Ares I-
X team to keep the vehicle’s design and hardware fabrication integrated across multiple NASA centers.
The vehicle segments, but also particularly the avionics hardware, fit and functioned together with
minimal rework. Problems were solved by a dedicated trouble-shooting team established on-site at the
VAB, with a separate team established to address issues with the over 700 sensors comprising the
developmental flight instrumentation (DFI).
One of the most surprising lessons learned during Ares I-X was the launch constraint imposed by
triboelectrification, a static-generating condition created by flying through moisture-laden clouds that can
interfere with radio signals to and from the vehicle. Triboelectrification can be mitigated most easily by
encasing electronics in “Faraday cage” structures that insulate electronics from exterior sources of static
and by covering the vehicle in non-static-producing paint. Late in the mission planning, there was some
question about whether Ares I-X had paint which was not consistent with triboelectrification requirements
on some of its exterior surfaces. Because the mitigation analysis was still in work as the launch day
approached, the four-hour scheduled launch windows in October were constrained by the need for nearly
cloud-free skies. Ares I-X finally launched on the second day’s attempt after multiple windows failed to
meet triboelectrification requirements. Future Ares vehicles will address this issue earlier in the
requirements process.
Additional challenges to launch were created by difficulties removing a five-hole probe sensor cover
prior to launch, commercial shipping entering the launch range, and the need to recheck the avionics
systems after a thunderstorm the night after the first day’s launch window.
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IV. Organizational Lessons Learned
Lessons learned from Ares I-X will be shared with the Ares Projects through written and verbal
reports and through integration of mission team members into the Project workforce.
As noted earlier, the flight and ground elements were developed, built, and integrated at multiple
NASA centers, making for a complex technical and management environment. Because of this
complexity and the likelihood that it will continue, Ares I-X was observed closely as a potential
management model for future human spaceflight projects.
Originally multiple organizations were charged with responsibility for executing Ares I-X, including
the Ares Projects Flight and Integrated Test Office (FITO) at MSFC, SE&I at LaRC, and Ground
Operations at KSC. The Ares I-X Mission Management Office (MMO) was established by the
Constellation Program as a separate organization uniting these diverse entities to reduce red tape,
overlapping/conflicting lines of authority, and numbers of review boards required to approve engineering
changes. With the MMO established, mission goals, roles, and responsibilities were more clearly defined
and progress became more rapid.
Over the course of test development, the MMO identified the following lessons learned as affecting
mission success:
Establish Clear Mission Objectives
In the case of Ares I-X, these objectives supported early definition of the flight and ground hardware
configurations; helped define the organizational structure; supported a more rapid development timeline;
and reduced continual assessment of mission objectives and requirements. As a result of establishing our
mission objectives early and not allowing them to evolve or “creep,” the team was able to stay on task
and, for the most part, stay on schedule.
Employ a Small and “Flat” Team Organization
The smaller, leaner, and “flatter” (compared to the Shuttle or parent Ares) organization minimized
decision times, encouraged communication among the various players, and enhanced a “sense of team.”
A small team provided almost a “skunk works”-like approach, where the MMO was able to pull talented
people and dedicated people from across the agency. One thing that could have been done earlier and
better was to co-locate key personnel in one location, but that option was not feasible. Instead, the team
communicated daily via teleconferences, email, and in-person meetings. However, there were times when
the smaller staff resulted in work overloading on particular individuals. The end result was that the small,
flat team worked well for Ares I-X, but it might not work in other situations. Efforts will need to be made
in the future to ensure that similar “lean” teams have contingency plans and backup resources to call upon
to reduce workload on key personnel.
Loads and Environments Development
The estimated aerodynamic, thermal, acoustic, and other loads and environments affecting the FTV
were analyzed right up to the end, as the computer models for the flight environments and the vehicle
flying through them evolved. The models evolved as the team learned to refine which elements of their
models were too conservative or not conservative enough. These loads analysis cycles caused a strain on
the team and additional time pressure as the launch date approached. In the future, flight test teams will
learn to expect loads and environments changes and plan accordingly.
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Establish Clear Development Flight Instrumentation (DFI) Requirements
When the engineers and scientists were originally asked what DFI sensors they needed or wanted on
the FTV for an effective test, the total requested resulted in a list of over 5,000 sensors. Additionally,
more time was spent discussing potential sensor removal (or better stated as “not installation”) than the
actual time installing the sensors. As a result of these situations, it became clear that working from the top
down based on flight test objectives leads to a more appropriate sensor suite. The MMO leadership team
came to realize that proposing a reduction to an approved sensor suite will most likely result in a lengthy
discussion (controversy). The best way to handle issues of this sort is to establish a separate DFI Control
Board.
It Takes a Lot of Effort to Change Very Strong Institutional and Programmatic Ways of Doing Business
While NASA is assumed by the public to be a single entity spread across multiple Centers, the fact
remains that each of these Centers has its own special history, institutional culture, and set of practices
that affect how business is done. For example, technical and procedural terminology is different between
centers, and there are variations in practices and procedures for verification, integrated testing,
engineering file formats, and review processes, which can impact the program. These inter-Center
differences mean that future mission teams will need to establish review processes early to eliminate
conflicting or overlapping engineering reviews. Another lesson learned while developing the avionics for
Ares I-X was that contractor processes are different from, and in some cases more applicable to, the
project at hand.
Establish an Engineering Development Fixture (EDF) for CAD 3-D Models
Early in the formation of the Ares I-X MMO, the team established a digital EDF that supported fit
checks of interfaces and configuration changes/updates; enabled the team to move through the design
process quickly while communicating at the design level between IPTs; and supported the engineering
and independent review process used in detailed communication of the design. By establishing the
requirement for an EDF early in the design process, the team was able to identify interferences early that
saved schedule, cost, and rework. A CAD model delivery schedule and format specifications also were
established as contractual requirements early in the flight test planning. One thing the Ares I-X team did
not do was establish fixed standards for submitting engineering models. As a result, a great deal of time
was spent converting file formats, which slowed our use of the EDF.
Conclusion
Ares I-X has provided NASA personnel with first-hand knowledge of how to develop, build, launch,
and absorb the lessons from a new launch vehicle. This valuable experience will continue to provide
dividends as the agency develops Ares I or another rocket to succeed the Space Shuttle. Hardware and
formal processes can be transferred from one generation of engineers and operations personnel relatively
easily. The more flight tests NASA personnel are able to perform in the coming years, the better prepared
they will be to handle future challenges and emergencies when human beings once again explore beyond
low-Earth orbit.
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Nomenclature
CAD Computer-Aided Design
CM Crew Module
DFI Developmental Flight Instrumentation
EDF Engineering Development Fixture
FTV Flight Test Vehicle
GC3 Ground Command, Control, and Communication
GRC Glenn Research Center
GSE Ground Service Equipment
ISS	 International Space Station
IV&V Independent Validation and Verification
KSC Kennedy Space Center
LaRC Langley Research Center
LAS Launch Abort System
LC	 Launch Complex
LEO Low-Earth Orbit
MLP Mobile Launcher Platform
MMO Mission Management Office
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
RoCS Roll Control System
SE&I Systems Engineering and Integration
SRB Solid Rocket Booster
USS Upper Stage Simulator
VAB Vehicle Assembly Building
VSS Vehicle Stabilization System
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
o' C[ 0	 v • 1 • •	 1
•
^^	 1	 1	 1 11	 1
r	 -	 _
I	 I ^	 f
RES X"
Aik
Ak	 Outline
f^t.01111AHUN	 4FS 4'Y
♦ Introduction to Ares I-X
• Mission Overview
• Hardware Overview 	 s
♦ Operational Lessons Learned
• Logistics and Infrastructure 	 ^.
• Vehicle Stacking and Launch
♦ Organizational Lessons Learned	 ; U
S
A
♦ Summary	 -^-
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 	 7465.2
Ares I-X: The Basics (1 of 2)
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♦ Mission overview
• Uncrewed, suborbital development flight test
• Collected engineering data from launch to first stage recovery
* Support Ares I critical design review
♦ Mission rationale
• The Ares Projects reflect the Apollo method of "test as you fly"
as well as current modeling practices until we are certain the
rocket is safe enough to launch astronauts into space
♦ Launch operations
• Vehicle launched 11:30 a.m. Eastern Time, October 28, 20097
from Launch Complex 39B at Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
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Ares I-X: The Basics (2 of 2)
♦ Hardware overview
• Primary flight hardware consisted of a four-segment solid rocket
booster from the Space Shuttle program
• Rocket controlled by Atlas V rocket avionics
♦ Status
• Mission successfully completed all primary mission objectives
• Onboard and telemetered data now being recovered and assessed
• First stage hardware being dismantled and examined
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Ares I-X Flight Test Objectives
Achieved ALL objectives:
Demonstrated control of a dynamically similar,
integrated Ares I/Orion, using
Ares I relevant ascent control algorithms
Performed an in-flight separation/staging
event between a Ares I-similar First Stage and a
representative Upper Stage
Demonstrated assembly and recovery of a
new Ares I-like First Stage element at KSC
Demonstrated First Stage separation
sequencing, and quantified First Stage
atmospheric entry dynamics, and
parachute performance
Characterized magnitude of integrated
vehicle roll torque throughout First Stage flight
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Center Firing Room
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Organizational Lessons Learned
♦ Establish clear mission objectives
♦ Employ a small and "flat" team organization
♦ Expect loads and environments to evolve
♦ Establish clear DFI requirements
♦ It takes a lot of effort to change very strong institutional and
programmatic ways of doing business
♦ Establish an engineering development fixture (EDF) for CAD
3-D models
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Summary
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♦ Ares I-X has provided NASA
personnel with first-hand
knowledge of how to develop,
build, and fly a new launch vehicle
♦ This valuable experience will
provide dividends as the agency
works with new launch vehicles
♦ Hardware and processes can be
transferred from one generation of
engineers and operations
personnel to the next
♦ The more flight tests NASA
personnel are able to perform, the
better prepared they will be to
handle future challenges and
emergencies
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